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CHOPPING MIRANDA DOWN TO SIZE
Michael Chertoff*
CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW. By Joseph D. Grano. Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1993. Pp. x, 336. $49.50.

Who's afraid of Miranda v. Arizona?l In the almost thirty years
since the Supreme Court decided Miranda, its decision has been
praised, criticized, expanded, curtailed, and even threatened with
extinction. A decade ago the U.S. Attorney General identified
Miranda as an insupportable decision ripe for abandonment;2 over
one year ago, the last member of the Miranda Court retired;3 and in
recent years, the Court itself has seemed to cast doubt upon the
vitality of Miranda. 4 Nevertheless, Miranda has survived and even
- in this era of the Rehnquist Court - flourished.
Why spill more ink then on the topic of Miranda? Who cares
anymore?
Actually, we all do - or should. Because, as Professor Joseph
D. Grano5 demonstrates in his comprehensive treatment of the policy and doctrinal roots of Miranda, the Miranda decision rests on
principles that reflect general and profound attitudes toward confessions, policing, and the nature of the criminal process. At its
most abstract level, Miranda heralded a dramatic and stillunresolved impulse to dismantle the traditional distinction between

* Michael Chertoff is a partner at Latham & Watkins, New York, New York, and Newark, New Jersey. He received his A.B. in 1975 and his J.D. in 1978 from Harvard University.
From 1983-1994, Mr. Chertoff served as a prosecutor with the U.S. Department of Justice,
including serving as U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey from 1990-94. The views
expressed herein are Mr. Chertoff's and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Department of Justice during the period in which he served.
1. 384 U.S. 436 {1966).
2. John A. Jenkins, Mr. Power, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 19; Philip
Shenon, Meese Seen as Ready to Challenge Rule on Telling Suspects of Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 1987, at A-1.
3. The members of the Court at the time of the Miranda decision and their dates of
retirement are as follows: Chief Justice Warren (1969); Associate Justices Clark (1967),
Fortas (1969), Black (1971), Harlan (1971), Douglas (1975), Stewart (1981), Brennan (1990),
and White (1993).
4. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) {holding that Miranda warnings are not
rendered inadequate as to a suspect who is informed that an attorney will be appointed for
him if and when he goes to court); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) {holding that failure
to administer Miranda warnings does not "taint" admissions made after a suspect has been
fully advised of and has waived his Miranda rights); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649
(1984) (creating a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be
given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence).
5. Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School.
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police investigation and the adversary courtroom process, treating
the former as a species of the latter by inviting lawyers into the
stationhouse. Although this impulse has never been given free rein,
at its logical extreme it could obliterate important, well-accepted
techniques of crime detection.
Much of the debate over the reach of Miranda stems from this
embedded impulse to subsume policing within the adversary courtroom process. Ironically, the core of the Miranda decision itself
need not have been so protean; whatever one thinks of the doctrinal foundation of Miranda, at most it supports only a fairly narrow
result. The transforming possibilities of the decision emerge from
subsequent embellishments of the Court's reasoning and from the
prescription of a rule that ranges beyond both the question
presented in the case and the logic of the answer. Put simply,
Miranda goes a rule too far, and its overreaching has been the
source of much of Miranda's troubled history.
Grano's book invites us to unpack Miranda. Let's identify the
two strands of its rule and the bases of its reasoning. Let's imagine
a world with a narrow Miranda rule, and then examine the tensions
within the post-Miranda world as it actually exists. Grano points
the Court toward overruling Miranda. But we need not revisit a
constitutional decision that, for better or worse, has survived. The
debate over the wisdom of that decision has now left the sphere of
the Constitution and entered the sphere of disciplinary rulemaking
that would enshrine Miranda as one of the canons of bar ethics.
THE ROOTS OF MIRAN.DA

Miranda claimed to rest on the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against compelled self-incrimination.6 The Court acknowledged
that the original.concept of compelled self-incrimination relates to
legal compulsion and thus engrafted on that concept the rule
against involuntary confessions.7 As Grano observes, one may
challenge Miranda's assertion that the privilege against selfincrimination and the prohibition on coerced confessions are in fact
connected as a matter of law and logic (pp. 131, 134-36). On the
other hand, one may view the relationship between selfincrimination and involuntary confessions as dependent: in order
to determine whether a suspect validly waived the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination, one must determine whether the suspect's waiver was voluntary or not. But whatever the foundation of
the connection between the self-incrimination privilege and the involuntariness rule, the real tour de force in Miranda is the Court's
6. 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
7. 384 U.S. at 458, 467.
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expansive redefinition of. the concept of impermissible involuntariness.
The Court's analysis in Miranda begins by cataloguing a veritable horror show of interrogative misbehavior, ranging from beatings, hangings, and whippings through exhausting incommunicado
questioning and forced sleeplessness, all the way to the threatened
removal of children and the questioning of a " 'near mental defective.' "8 To the extent that such misbehavior offended traditional
notions of due process, however, it was already explicitly forbidden
by the Fifth or F:ourteenth Amendments.9 Miranda's novelty lay in
extending the traditional due process limitations on police interrogation by suggesting that all custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, irrespective of its actual circumstances (pp. 135-36).
The law, however, simply did not support the proposition that
mere custodial questioning is automatically coercive. So the Court
went about seeking to establish this proposition indirectly. First,
the Court hinted that the very privacy within which police interrogation. occurs creates a presumption of impropriety.10 Then, the
Court seemingly upbraided the police for trying to obtain a confession.11 Other techniques evidently viewed askance by the Court include "display[ing] an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt,"12
obtaining a psychological advantage by confronting the suspect
outside his home ground, and offering the subject sympathetic rationalizations for the suspected offense.13 . Finally, the Court condemned the familiar "Mutt and Jeff" routine and police officers'
use of deception. 14 In short, the Court virtually equated involuntariness with "trad[ing] on the weakness of individuals." 15
This reasoning comes perilously close to treating any confession
as per se involuntary. The Court implicitly seemed to regard as voluntary only those confessions offered after polite police questioning
in a setting comfortable for the suspect and after full disclosure by
the interrogators. Indeed, it is hard to see why the criticisms of
traditional interrogative methods should have been limited to custo8. 384 U.S. at 446-56.
9. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322-24 (1959) (holding that the interrogation of a formally charged defendant for eight consecutive hours while ignoring his requests
to contact his attorney violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,
53-55 (1949) (holding that the interrogation of a suspect for six days without allowing the
suspect the benefit of counsel or a preliminary ltearing violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
10. 384 U.S. at 448-50.
11. 384 U.S. at 448-50.
12. 384 U.S. at 450.
13. 384 U.S. at 449-52.
14. 384 U.S. at 452-53.
15. 384 U.S. at 455.
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dial questioning, as the police are capable of using deceptiveness
and psychological ploys to elicit admissions in a noncustodial
setting.
This analysis pointed the Court toward a rule that would have
excluded all confessions, or at least all custodial confessions, as evidence in criminal cases. Yet the Court drew back from an automatic invalidation of all confessions, and even suggested that
citizens ought to respond to police inquiries made in a noncustodial
setting.16 The reason is not hard to see. A ruling that all confessions - or all confessions induced by, some form of pressure or
influence - are involuntary would have overthrown a substantial
body of prior case law, including the very precedents that had adumbrated the rules on voluntariness. If all custodial confessions are
inherently involuntary, then there is no reason to test them for voluntariness. So, after all the hue and cry about police unfairness in
obtaining confessions, the Court's cure was to insist that the suspect
be "effectively apprised of his rights." 17
Importing a warnings requirement into the waiving of the privilege against self-incrimination has some appeal as a policy matter,
however questionable it may be as a matter of constitutional law. If
a waiver must be both knowing and voluntary, a warning can be
justified as a prophylactic assurance that the subject has knowledge,
thus leaving the issue of voluntariness to a conventional due process
analysis of the coerciveness of the circumstances. One might conclude as a legislator or rulemaker, therefore, that the police should
advise a suspect that he is under no legal compulsion to speak and
that if he does so he might suffer the consequences. A postwarning
confession would then be analyzed for voluntariness under the due
process test. Such a regime would be generally consistent with the
prior voluntariness cases and would reflect only the novelty of insisting on an explicit reminder that the subject may choose not to
incriminate himself.
But this reasoning at most only supports cautionary instructions
on the right to remain silent and the consequences of failing to exercise that right. Such instructions would reflect the Fifth Amendment privilege on which the Court expressly relied in Miranda and
would give notice of the scope of the waiver sought by the police
interrogators. Had Miranda been limited to this kind of notice requirement, it would be defensible as at least addressing the constitutional provision the Court was construing, even if the underlying
interpretive effort might be doubtful (pp. 142-43).
With sleight of hand, however, the Court transcended the textual limitations of the right against self-incrimination and intro16. 384 U.S. at 477-78.
17. 384 U.S. at 467.
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duced a right to the presence of counsel at the interrogation. As a
matter of legal doctrine, Grano convincingly demonstrates that this
right is insupportable (pp. 157-58, 170-72). Precedent did support
- as an independent legal right - the accused's right to counsel in
facing the prosecution after the criminal process has begun. That
right was founded, not in any concern about coercive police behavior, but in the text of the Sixth Amendment, which mandates the
assistance of counsel for defendants in "all criminal prosecutions."18
Until Miranda's direct progenitor Escobedo v. Illinois, 19 courts had
applied that right only at the classic adversary stage when the contest moves into the courtroom. The rationale was that a defendant
formally charged and engaged in the judicial process against trained
advocates should have legal advice. Even Massiah v. United States20
- which established a postindictment right to counsel during questioning - created such a right by reasoning that once formal
charges are filed, the state must address the defendant through "a
trial, 'in an orderly courtroom, presided over by a judge, open to
the public, and protected by all the procedural safeguards of the
law.' " 21 Indeed, Massiah did not even involve coercive questioning; it reflected a traditional and textual view that the Constitution
treats the indictment as a watershed, after which the formal machinery of the judicial process - including the right to counsel,
speedy trial, confrontation, and trial by. jury becomes
operational.
None of this earlier law suggested, of course, that there is a right
to counsel in all criminal investigations or on all occasions when the
individual confronts the police. To the contrary, the Court's reasoning before Escobedo indicated the opposite because the panoply
of Sixth Amendment rights was logically - and, in light of the text,
inevitably - triggered by the same event: charging the accused
with committing the crime. Expanding the scope of the Sixth
Amendment into the precharging period would have yielded such
curiosities as a right to speedy trial at the time of investigation, or a
right to confront witnesses as police are interviewing them at the
scene of the crime, or a right to have counsel present in the grand
jury room.
To be sure, earlier cases noted that the presence of counsel at an
interrogation is a factual circumstance to be weighed in evaluating
whether a confession was coerced.22 But this presence is relevant
merely because counsel would not likely have allowed coercive be18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
377 U.S. at 204 (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959)).
See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 376 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1963).
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havior; thus, counsel's presence is probative evidence of the voluntariness of the confession. Consequently, the police would have a
substantial incentive to supply counsel to defendants in preindictment interrogations. It is fallacious, nonetheless, to conclude from
this evidence - or even presumption -. of voluntariness that an
independent legal right to counsel exists at an interrogation. Put
another way, although counsel's presence may be sufficient to establish voluntariness,. it is not necessary to establish voluntariness;
voluntariness can be· established based on other circumstances.
The obvious conclusion - the conclusion drawn by the dissenters in Miranda - is that the majority's creation of a preindictment
right to counsel was an artifice designed to eliminate custodial confessions sub silentio. As Justice Harlan observed, "if counsel arrives, there is rarely going to be a police station confession. "23 The
less obvious effect of Miranda's creation of a preindictment right to
counsel was the striking extension of the judicially oriented adversary process into the investigative arena.
Cases decided after Miranda underscore the tenuous quality of
the extension of a right to counsel into the preindictment period. ,
As Grano observes, the Supreme Court subsequently declined to
engage the Sixth Amendment in any other case involving police activity before the start of formal charging proceedings (pp. 153-55).
If there was a shrouded Sixth Amendment limb supporting
Miranda, later cases rendered it very frail indeed.
But Escobedo-Miranda's effort to expand the right to counsel
into the preaccusation period did not merely disregard the doctrinal
and textual limitations on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel (p.
152). In fact, one can conclude that the expansion was part of a
deliberate - if ultimately only partially successful - design to
breach those limitations and make policing part of the adversary
judicial process.24
THE FRUITS OF MIRANDA

In spite of the doctrinal weakness of the right to counsel branch
of Miranda, it has sprouted much of the post-Miranda controversy.
The Court has expanded that branch of the Miranda doctrine far
more than the right to silence branch.
Take waiver, for example. Michigan v. Mosley25 makes clear
that when an interrogee requests that questioning cease, police may
nonetheless initiate questioning at a later time and even secure a
23. 384 U.S. 436, 516 n.12 (1966).
24. Tellingly, the Miranda majority at one point referred explicitly to police interrogation
as "a phase of the adversary system." 384 U.S. at 469.
25. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
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valid waiver of the right to silence.26 In contrast, when an individual requests the right to counsel, a court will not sustain a subsequent waiver of that right unless the individual initiates new
discussions.27 Indeed, police may not initiate questioning even if
counsel has been afforded; what is necessary to resume questioning
is that the lawyer be present.28
As Justice Powell observed in Edwards v. Arizona, 29 it is hard to
see why there should be a double standard of waiver for the right to
silence and the right to counsel.30 Perhaps the best rationale offered is that a request for counsel indicates a desire to surrender
individual decisionmaking authority and implicitly disables future
uncounseled waivers. But actually the double standard betrays the
fact that the right to counsel prong of Miranda does more than simply warn an individual of his rights: it offers that person the ability
to transform the preindictment, preaccusatory custodial setting into
a forum with the characteristics of the more formal, postaccusatory
criminal process.
This not-so-latent transforming impulse in Miranda has led several members of the Court considerably further. In Arizona v.
Roberson, 31 the Court held that th~ "prophylactic" rule of Edwards,
which forbids police-initiated questioning·of anyone in custody who
requests counsel, extends even to questioning by other officers
about unrelated investigations.32 The Court's explicit rationale was
that once a suspect "has indicated his inability to cope with the
pressures of custodial investigation," he should be insured against
questioning on any other topic.33 Presumably this rule applies even
if the second investigation has focused on the suspect only as a subject or possible witness, and even if the second investigation is in its
infancy (p. 161). Again, the relentless logic of the Miranda right-tocounsel prong drives the Court to hand the suspect in custody the
power to transform even unrelated nascent investigations into adversary proceedings.
The logic of Roberson is capable of almost infinite expansion.
For example, one might argue that once an individual has asked for
26. 423 U.S. at 104 ("[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends ..• on whether his 'right to cut off questioning' was
scrupulously honored.").
·
27. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (holding that an accused, after
asserting his right to counsel, is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been
made available to him or the accused, himself, initiates further communication).
28. 451 U.S. at 485.
29. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
30. 451 U.S. at 489-90 (Powell, J., concurring).
31. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
32. 486 U.S. at 682.
33. 486 U.S. at 686.
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counsel during one interrogation, he should be free from custodial
interrogations in the future even if he has been released from the
first interrogation. Or, one might advocate an even more extreme
position - that people should be able to file notices with the police
indicating prospectively that they want counsel if they are ever
questioned in custody. Once the complex of Miranda rights becomes a device to make all police questioning into a legal adversary
proceeding, there is no logical stopping point.
Indeed, some Justices - albeit not a majority - would cut
Miranda entirely from its roots in the doctrine of coerced confessions by holding that the lawyer for the suspect can trigger the right
to counsel even without the suspect's knowledge. In Moran v.
Burbine, 34 three Justices were prepared to hold that Miranda restrained the police generally from interfering with the attorneyclient relationship during a period of preaccusatory custodial interrogation, even if the suspect, after being informed of his rights, did
not request counsel.35 In this minority view, the police were
obliged, among other things, to inform the suspect that an attorney
not requested by him had called on his behalf. The denial of this
information cannot in a meaningful sense be called coercive, because it does not alter the circumstances of questioning or the pressures felt by the suspect. But the denial is significant if Miranda is a
means by which police interrogation is transmuted into a quasiadversary proceeding.
'
The linchpin of the Moran dissenters' view is encapsulated in
the rhetorical introduction and coda of the dissent. The trio of dissenting Justices contrasts its view of lawyers as crucial players in an
accusatorial society with the view of the majority, which is charged
with viewing the lawyer as a "nettlesome obstacle ... as in ~n inquisitorial society."36 Simply put, the Moran minority would complete the Miranda revolution and obliterate the distinction between
a preaccusation police investigation and the postaccusation adversary judicial system. Under this expansive view, the criminal justice
process itself would become a judicial adversary process.
As Grano notes, Moran is in some ways a watershed, for it
marks a point beyond which a majority of the Court was not prepared to venture (pp. 153-54). Moran itself finally reaffirms that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not an invitation to transform the investigative process but is "applicable only when the government's role shifts from investigation to accusation. For it is only
then that the assistance of one versed in the 'intricacies ... of law,'
is needed- to assure that" the prosecution's case encounters 'the cru34. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
35. 475 U.S. at 434-68 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
36. 475 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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cible of meaningful adversarial testing.' "37 As Grano properly
notes, the types of decisions faced by a suspect prior to formal accusation are not particularly intricate (p. 169). Thus, Moran explicitly
repudiates the impulse of Miranda to "wrap a protective cloak
around the attorney-client relationship for its own sake."38
Yet even after Moran, the thrust of the Miranda right to counsel
is not fully blunted. First, even in the wake of Moran, cases such as
Roberson indicate that a request for counsel can trigger broad protection against future interrogation on different subjects, as opposed to the narrow protection afforded by a request for silence.
Second, and more important, the ethic of Miranda's right to counsel
has seeped into the criminal law in other respects, giving rise to a
comparatively new series of claims that the attorney-client relationship of its own force should afford represented individuals protection, not only against custodial interrogation, but also against any
sort of police questioning and even undercover operations. This
new, nonconstitutional landscape is where the seed of Miranda's
revolution in the right to counsel is now planted.
SEEDLINGS OF MIRANDA

Grano's deconstruction of Miranda spurs him to believe that the
case was inherently and fatally flawed (p. 199). But in a sense the
thrust of Miranda's right to counsel ·has spread beyond constitutional doctrine. Perhaps those who sought to expand the right to
counsel into the stationhouse always knew that they would have to
leave the Constitution itself in search of firmer footing for their effort. Indeed, Miranda itself draws freely on nonconstitutional
sources as support for the expansion of the right to counsel.39 In
Moran, the dissenters criticized the Court for disregarding contrary
state decisions and the views of the American Bar Association
(ABA).40 Not surprisingly, therefore, it was the ABA rules governing professional conduct that gave rise to the most recent - and
far-reaching - effort to transform police investigation into an adversary process.
·
Grano himself gives fairly short shrift to the effect of Mirandatype disciplinary rulemaking (pp. 162-63). But in the practicing
world of criminal law, that effect has been profound. In 1988, the
Second Circuit surprised many prosecutors with its decision in
United States v. Hammad41 that sanctions, evidentiary suppression,
or both could result if law enforcement contacts with represented
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

475 U.S. at 430 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).
475 U.S. at 430.
384 U.S. 436, 449-52, 486-90 (1966).
475 U.S. at 441 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
846 F.2d 854, modified, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990).
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individuals were held to violate the disciplinary rule forbidding
counsel from communicating directly with an opposing party represented by counsel. Hammad, as originally cast - not in its subsequent modification - seemed to reinvigorate the Miranda right to
counsel with a vengeance: whenever a suspect retained counsel, he
might be immune not only from custodial interrogation, but also
from police questioning and even from contact by an undercover
agent. Another Second Circuit decision42 suggested that the "practice of routinely conducting pre-arraignment interviews raises serious constitutional questions," particularly when "the practice is
invoked ... against a defendant who is ... unrepresented. "43 The
Second Circuit suggested that if a suspect could have been represented - even if he did not request to be - he should be shielded
from questioning.
These ample readings of the ABA disciplinary rules suggest a
regime in which uncounseled interrogation is effectively forbidden,
and in which counsel must be provided for all but the most casual
interactions between law enforcement agents and the individual.
Such a practice would, of course, entail the complete abandonment
of the distinction between police investigation and adversary judicial proceedings, merging the former into the latter. This result
would complete the revolution originally heralded by Miranda's notion of the right to counsel. Indeed, the arguments advanced to
support such a dramatic expansion of the right to counsel under the
ABA rules resonate with the Escobedo-Miranda arguments of
thirty years ago, that textual limitations on the right to counsel
should be overlooked because preaccusatory police questioning can
be so critical to the eventual outcome of a criminal case. As we
have seen, that earlier set of arguments formed the original foundation for Miranda's impulse to subsume police investigation within a
drastically expanded concept of the adversary process.
The vitality of Miranda's right-to-counsel branch continues to
be debated, therefore - but outside the restraints of constitutional
text and, instead, within the framework of the ABA disciplinary
rules. Even if the Supreme Court has finally pruned Miranda's
right to counsel as a constitutional matter, the case's rationale now
fuels bar association arguments for the preindictment, preaccusation presence of counsel for all police questioning. The U.S. Department of Justice has recently promulgated regulations that
curtail the application of such broad disciplinary restraints on federal prosecutors.44 Those regulations are likely to be challenged; in
42. United States v. Foley, 735 F.2d 45 {2d Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 1161 {1985).
43. 735 F.2d at 48.
44. Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,928 {1994) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 77).
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any event, they afford no protection to state and local prosecutors.
The wisdom, if not the constitutional underpinnings, of Miranda's
protean theory of the right to counsel remains of tremendous current interest to those concerned abotJ.t how police should be able to
investigate crime.
Grano's book, therefore, is not merely a rehearsal of doctrinal
discussions now put to rest by the Supreme Court. Rather, it focuses us on a critical disagreement that first emerged in the constitutional setting in the Sixties and has now been raised again in the
rulemaking arena in the Nineties. Indeed, the most valuable part of
the book may not, be its central focus - the discu~sion of academic
arguments about constitutional interpretation - but its prefatory
analysis of the policy considerations at stake when some seek to use
disciplinary rulemaking to merge police investigation into the adversary process.
Will the American criminal justice system retain its traditional
division between police investigation and the postaccusation adversary process, or will the right to counsel serve as the instrument by
which police investigation is transformed into a quasi-judicial adversary process? That debate will now leave the auspices of the
Constitution and become a subject of bar disciplinary discussions.
Resolution of these issues should not be left to the comparative few
who make up the councils of the bar associations; they deserve attention in the broader public - or even legislative - arena.

